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World Peace:
The Legacy of Edmund S. Muskie
George J. Mitchell*
When Ed Muskie's parents came to the United States, they left the Polish
province of the Imperial Russian Empire. Their son served with millions of
other Americans in World War II, a war which began with the Nazi
onslaught against his ancestral homeland and ended with a partially
resurrected Poland.
A few weeks before Ed Muskie ended thirty-five years in public office
as more than thirty Soviet armored divisions massed on Poland's borders,
he found himself meeting his NATO counterparts in Brussels to issue joint
warnings to the Soviet Union. In December 1980, it was an open question
if the Soviets would invade. The Soviets did not invade, though no one at
that time could have predicted the outcome of that chapter of the Cold War
with certainty.
When Ed Muskie entered public life in 1946, a surge of isolationism in
America led to a hasty post-war demobilization. He served as governor of
Maine at the height of the Cold War. Yet, when he died in 1996,
isolationism was no longer a tenable idea.
In 1968, he travelled America as the vice-presidential candidate on
Hubert Humphrey's ticket. Some observers described him as the best of
the four men then contending for the presidency. He often said that this
campaign was the best experience of his political career, because he saw
and learned so much about this country.
In the midst of that presidential campaign, Ed Muskie found himself
on the stage of a small college in western Pennsylvania. A few students
tried to shout him down, insult him, and, in the end, deny him the chance
to be heard. Those who did not live through the Vietnam War can have no
notion of the ferocity with which anti-war and anti-anti-war Americans
criticized each other. Anti-war activists shaped the debate. Anti-anti-war
activists developed intense loathing of the campus rebellions. Before
Vietnam, America had seen race pitted against race, region pitted against
region, rich pitted against poor. It had never experienced generation
against generation. It was a time of emotional intensity that is hard to
recapture today.
In those days, officials who were confronted by unruly crowds usually
registered their disgust and left the event. Most of them simply avoided
college audiences.
* This article was prepared with the assistance of Leon G. Billings, former
Administrative Assistant to Edmund S. Muskie, and Anita Holst Jensen, former
legislative assistant to Edmund S. Muskie.
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Ed Muskie was made of different stuff. Confronted by a noisy student
crowd, Ed Muskie did not waver or retreat. Instead, he reached across the
generational abyss. He offered his opponents the chance to be heard-he
agreed to turn over the microphone to one of them for ten minutes on the
condition that they then listened to him for ten minutes. The students
accepted and when his turn came, he told them his American story. Here,
in America, it is possible to do anything. The son of a tailor could rise to
unimagined political heights.
What he told those students explains much about his politics:
I was born the son of parents who knew the disadvantages that came with
discrimination and poverty. If you think all of these things were invented
yesterday, or since you were born, you are sadly mistaken.
I have had to work all of my life. I have worked for myself, I have worked for
my family, I have worked for my community, I have worked for my State,
and I have worked for my country.
And I did so under the guidance of a father who left Russian-occupied
Poland under the Czarist tyranny when he was less than 17 years old, to find
the very things that Rick Brody [the students' speaker] says you are pro-
testing to find.
He tore himself out of his home life, tore himself away from a family he was
never to see again, to go into a foreign land with only five years of formal
education, with a newly learned trade as a tailor, to take up life and to find
opportunity for himself and for the children who were yet unborn.
And the year before he died, his son became the first Polish-American ever
elected Governor of an American State. Now, that may not justify the Ameri-
can system to you, but it sure did to him ....
It is not my purpose to belabor you with.., any argument, or any point of
view or any personal view. But I want to say to you that there are those of us
in this system who have worked for the objectives that I hear you voicing
every day. Maybe not as effectively as we might, because of our own short-
comings and weaknesses; maybe not in the way you would and that you will
when you are given the opportunity. But don't misjudge the basic good will
of this American system toward the objective of making it truly a system
responsive to the needs and the will and the voice of the 200 million Ameri-
cans who make up this society.1
Ed Muskie will always be one of the most distinguished graduates of
the Cornell Law School-not because he was an active litigator and not
because he became President. He was neither. He will be remembered for
the quality of his mind; the toughness, the rigor, the common sense; and
for another quality: the courage to take risks for what he saw as right.
When Ed Muskie entered public life there were two nuclear superpow-
ers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He never lost the intuition that Soviet inten-
tions were not all peaceful. However, he maintained the common sense
1. Speech at Washington County Courthouse, Washington, Pennsylvania, Sept. 25,
1968, courtesy of The Edmund S. Muskie Archives, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine.
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that told him a nuclear-armed world demanded some kind of
accommodation.
In 1971, after a visit to Moscow, a reporter asked him if he felt more
hopeful about U.S.-Soviet relations, and he replied:
I don't find hope a very useful commodity. Realism is a better one, and as I
said earlier I find a very positive prospect forthcoming in the first two areas
[scientific and space cooperation] on the part of the Soviets. So I would like
to see those pressed and in that respect you might say I feel better about
those two than before I went there. But I don't like to use words like "hope"
or hold up pie in the sky with respect of the Soviets' ultimate intentions[.] I
think we just get engaged in rather useless rhetoric when we get into specu-
lation about that.2
He lived to see the fall of the Soviet Union and the corresponding reaction
in favor of democracy and free markets.
It is possible to cast Ed Muskie as an idealist. He believed in this
country and he believed in the human spirit. He was a person of deep
religious faith, but his confidence in the human endeavor stemmed from
something beyond the observance of religion. It stemmed from his strong
belief that people, aided by their common sense and their will, can achieve.
He came from a small town, Rumford, Maine. He entered politics
reluctantly, because he saw a one-party state which did not adequately
serve the interests of the people. The people of Maine elected him Gover-
nor in 1954, at a time when Democrats were still a small minority. He
came to the Senate in 1959, as a new Senator and promptly alienated Sen-
ate Majority Leader and future President, Lyndon Johnson.
In spite of this beginning, he was a very effective Senator, a dedicated
vice-presidential nominee, and a respected Secretary of State. He failed to
scale the mountaintop of American politics, but what he did with his time,
in and out of public office, vastly overshadows the contributions that most
of us have been able to make, even some who reached that far peak.
Upon his election to the Senate, he joined a group of Senators who
spent thirty days in the Soviet Union, at a time when Khrushchev's boasts
of the ultimate triumph of communism were made against the backdrop of
the Sputnik satellite and the Luna moon craft successes.
A dozen years later, after a 1971 trip to Europe, the Soviet Union and
the Middle East, he described the purpose of his travels in uniquely human
terms:
I think it is rather obvious that personal exposure .... adds a dimension to
one's understanding of the country or its policies or its posture in a particu-
lar area of the world.... It is easier to understand a policy if you have some
personal acquaintance with the men who are responsible for the policy. It is
easier to understand the people and their attitude if one moves and mingles
with them. This is the kind of dimension I think I added to my understand-
ing of the problem and the issues which make these particular countries in
2. Press Conference, Washington D.C., Jan. 18, 1971, transcript courtesy of The
Edmund S. Muskie Archives, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine.
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these particular areas of interest to American citizens at this time. 3
In 1969, Ed Muskie observed that American and Soviet nuclear forces
had reached such a parallel of destructive force that the best course was to
use the essential parity of nuclear reprisal available to both sides as a start-
ing point for negotiations aimed at preventing the building of a new gener-
ation of weapons.
His analysis of the situation, and his warning, remains as clear a
description of the nuclear stand-off as any:
Since the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union have
engaged in competition to develop more powerful armaments.
No one questions that-under present circumstances-military power is an
essential part of our security system; but there is a point where preoccupa-
tion with purely military strength may diminish rather than increase our
security. I believe we are at that point.
We are already involved in a new cycle of an ever more costly and perilous
competition for nuclear superiority. At the same time, we and the Soviet
Union have within our grasp a way to restrain this competition and to reas-
sert a saner ordering of our national priorities.
A strategic stalemate exists between the United States and the Soviet Union
today. Neither nation can launch an attack on the other without bringing on
its own destruction. Neither nation can realistically hope to break this stale-
mate by developing a new generation of nuclear weapons. Each nation has
the capacity to match any weapons developed by the other. Both sides tend
to react to the potentiaUties as well as the actualities of action. It is precisely
this cycle of action and reaction which fuels the arms race.
In spite of this fact, the public has been allowed-even encouraged-to
believe that somehow there is safety in ever-growing weapons strength and
that it still means something to be ahead numerically in nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, forces are now in motion which can undermine our chances
for achieving a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviets. The deci-
sion to proceed with the deployment of the ABM was a setback, but even
more serious is the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union are
rapidly developing the capacity to deploy multiple independently-targeted
re-entry vehicles-so-called MIRVs-missiles which can carry several war-
heads and launch them at separate targets.
The MIRV-ABM development is a classic example of arms escalation which
results in less, rather than more, national security.
We rationalized development of a MIRV system as a response to a limited
Soviet ABM system and its possible expansion. The Soviets, in turn, started
development of a MIRV system to insure parity in intercontinental missile
systems for themselves. We moved to develop an ABM system in response to
the Soviet moves to develop and deploy MIRVs. And so the arms race contin-
ues, unrelated to the real security of either nation.4
3. Id.
4. Speech, New York, N.Y., Oct. 21, 1969, courtesy of The Edmund S. Muskie
Archives, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine.
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These words precisely describe the manner in which the two countries
escalated the nuclear arms race. Muskie said it best when he pointed out:
"It is a race with no finish line and the runner in second place always has
time to close the gap."5
Events, of course, have fully borne out Muskie's warning. SALT I, lim-
iting ABM sites to two on each side was ratified in 1971. But MIRVing of
missiles was a central reason why it took until 1979 to reach agreement on
SALT II. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ended any chance for Senate
ratification of SALT II, which never even reached a Senate vote. Although
both sides informally honored the SALT II provisions, that did not prevent
President Reagan's long flirtation with abrogating the ABM treaty through
his efforts to develop and deploy Star Wars weaponry to shoot down
incoming missiles.
Out of office, Muskie remained actively engaged in the search for arms
control. He endorsed the "build-down" rather than the Nuclear Freeze in
the early 1980s, although he had himself proposed moratoriums on cer-
tain weapons developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the early
1980s, Muskie joined former President Richard Nixon and others in pri-
vate efforts to seek avenues by which President Reagan could be persuaded
to lower his rhetoric against the Soviets, lest he inadvertently provoke a
Soviet overreaction.
As he said in 1985 when the Geneva talks began,
[We should maintain dialogue with the Soviets, precisely because they are
our adversaries... Any serious leader with responsibility for conducting our
nation's foreign policy will eventually reach this conclusion, as President
Reagan has. But we would all have been better served if the president had
entered office intending to conduct serious negotiations rather than waiting
to do so.6
Muskie had few illusions about what he called "summit fever." He also
warned that "[i]f some Americans place a lower value on negotiations than
they deserve, others invest higher hopes in them than are justified. Ameri-
cans have a dismaying tendency to believe that negotiations inevitably
must produce agreements and that agreements can do away with the
problems dividing the two superpowers."7 He urged patience and realism,
and reminded us that the Soviets were always stubborn and at times unrea-
sonable. But he never gave up on the idea that the nuclear arms race was
so potentially dangerous that it could not safely be ignored.
In 1987, long out of office, Muskie warned that former Secretary of
State Kissinger and others who urged the abrogation of SALT I by reinter-
pretation were displaying a
cavalier attitude.., toward American constitutional practice. To condone
the notion that a president can sell a treaty on an interpretation that he or
5. Id.
6. Edmund S. Muskie, Launch Words, Not Weapons, BERGEN Cout'rn REc., May 19,
1985.
7. Id.
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his successor can subsequently alter would render meaningless the Senate's
power to offer advice and consent. That is not constitutional government; it
is despotism.
What tragic irony if those who sold us MIRV as necessary to overwhelm
nonexistent defenses would now sell us SDI as necessary to meet the
thousands of warheads bred by MIRV! Responsible policy must forswear
technological escapism.8
After the collapse of the Soviet system, he agreed to serve on an advisory
council to a group headed by former President Nixon, which encouraged
the development and growth of small and medium-sized private businesses
in Russia. He believed that while negotiating with the Soviets as adversa-
ries required patience and realism, aid to a struggling post-Soviet state was
the highest kind of self-interested realism. He recognized that no matter
how disparate American and Russian values and goals might be, Ameri-
cans and Russians will always liqe on the same planet, and together we
must choose between being antagonists or allies.
Ed Muskie was a convinced internationalist from the beginning. Not
only did he begin his Senate career with a trip to the Soviet Union in 1959,
he joined what became known as the Mansfield Mission in 1965. At Presi-
dent Johnson's request, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield led a delegation
that traveled 30,000 miles in 37 days, visiting eastern Europe, Western
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, including the five countries of Southeast
Asia. The purpose of the Mission was to assess international reaction to
the introduction of U.S. troops into South Vietnam. He returned to Viet-
nam in 1967 to monitor the elections there. In 1971, he undertook an
unofficial visit to Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East, to see and
speak with as many foreign leaders as he could, informally, without the
burden of carrying messages or signals from the United States
Government.
Muskie was an internationalist, but he did not believe U.S. interests
could or should be held hostage to the goals of the global community when
the global community failed to act or found itself unable to act.
As the Senate's and the nation's leading environmental lawmaker, he
served as an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence. In 1974, he went to Caracas in that capacity. Initially one of the
strongest proponents of the proposed new international Law of the Sea,
Muskie did not allow his hopes to overcome his common sense. When it
became evident that the Conference would not produce a treaty within a
reasonable time span, he backed the establishment of the 200-mile eco-
nomic zone, now broadly accepted worldwide. He reported his experience
several weeks later:
8. Edmund S. Muskie, Kissinger the Revisionist, WASH. PosT, Mar. 27, 1987, at A27.
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The reaction was that this kind of unilateral action could conceivably tor-
pedo the conference. Well, with respect to the conference, let me state my
own view.
I was reassured that the prospects for eventually writing a new law of the sea
were more promising than I expected them to be before I attended the con-
ference. But my second impression is that achieving that goal is going to
take much longer than the more optimistic of the delegates to the conference
would like to suggest.
We were told that the United States ought not to act that irresponsibly. And
so we suggested a course of action that might serve as a substitute. If we
were being asked to exercise restraint with respect to this kind of legislation
[the 200-mile economic zone], then it seemed to us not unreasonable to ask
restraint of those who created the problem off our coasts-the Soviet Union
andJapan. And I suggested that to them-got very little positive response, I
might say.
One of the Russian delegates said to me, 'Well, Senator, you're being a little
hard-nosed about this.' I said, 'Yes, and I've never seen you Russians reluc-
tant to be hard-nosed in protecting your national interests.' And I say it's
time for us to be hard-nosed about this matter if we're to have any effective
protection of our fishery stocks.
May I say that protecting these fishery stocks is something more than a
national interest. It's a global interest. If we coastal states don't take effec-
tive action to protect these stocks, who in heaven's name is going to do so?
The Russian fishing fleet? The Japanese fishing fleet? . .. [Wihatever
doubts I may have had on that score before I went to Caracas have been
resolved by my attendance at that conference, notwithstanding the fact that I
would still prefer an international law of the sea.9
In 1983 President Reagan declined to sign the final treaty.
Just as he recognized it was futile for either nuclear power to seek
superiority, because in a nuclear reckoning there is no such thing as supe-
riority, he also recognized that there was no support in the Senate in 1966
for an immediate and abrupt end to the American role in Vietnam. He was
right. In 1968, during the presidential campaign, he was asked if his views
had changed. He replied: "Well, the situation has changed. So views
change. The situation isn't static. Our policy has changed."
He acknowledged that he had been mistaken in thinking that because
there was no support for withdrawal in 1966, there was no support for it
later. He said, of the widespread war debate, that Americans were
"engaged in a unique and somewhat awkward experiment. We are
engaged in an effort to change a major aspect of our foreign policy in pub-
lic view, while our country is involved in a war and in diplomatic negotia-
9. Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on 200-mile
limit, Sept. 6, 1974, transcript courtesy of The Edmund S. Muskie Archives, Bates Col-
lege, Lewiston, Maine.
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tions to end that war."' 0
He recognized the dangers in that experiment, but he thought that
while it ought to induce caution, it should not impose silence on dissenting
voices:
One of the most dangerous assumptions in a democratic society is to con-
clude that only the President, the Cabinet and his generals are competent to
make judgments on the national interest. Their judgments and their actions,
which are fallible, must be subjected to constant scrutiny, tempered by the
knowledge of our own individual fallibility. As the President may be wrong,
so may we be wrong.'1
The long-lived legislative effort by the Congress to extricate U.S. troops
from South Vietnam ended with a series of debates over the distinctions
between resolutions to cut off funding for the military effort and laying
down a specific date for the end of the American involvement. No clear-cut
disengagement date ever garnered sufficient support in both houses to
carry the day, and the continued wrangling over funding left President
Nixon largely to his own devices to end the war, which ultimately "ended"
with the peace treaty of 1973.
The arguments over how best to deal with intransigent Executives,
when the Congress lacked the veto-proof two-thirds majorities needed to
curtail military action resulted in passage of the War Powers Act, onto
which the Members of Congress piled their resentments and ambitions. As
the floor manager of the debate over the bill in the Senate, Muskie played a
key role in the fashioning of this law and in the Congressional override of
President Nixon's veto.
The act was intended to allow effective use of the Article I power
granted by the Constitution, that the Congress shall have the power to
declare war. Unfortunately, and over Muskie's objections, it contained and
still contains, the seeds of its own limitations. Efforts to reform it and
efforts to invoke it have been unsuccessful ever since. No Congress wants
to be seen as tying the hands of the Commander-in-Chief when the lives of
American soldiers are on the line. Yet no President of either party has ever
acknowledged any duties under the War Powers Act as it currently stands.
It is an odd quirk of history that the failed Desert One mission to Iran,
leading to Muskie's nomination to the Cabinet, prompted several Senators
to demand the reason why President Carter had failed to consult Congress
(as the War Powers Act requires) within the first 48 hours of the mission's
being launched.
A related interest of Muskie's in those years, the question of govern-
ment secrecy in an open society, was one to which he returned when the
Iran-Contra scandal exploded. Along with former Senator John Tower and
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Muskie was appointed to the Tower Com-
10. Speech, Vietnam Moratorium Day, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine, Oct. 15,
1969, courtesy of The Edmund S. Muside Archives, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine.
11. Id.
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mission which undertook the first outside review of the Reagan White
House acts involving secret fund-raising, weapons sales, and freelance
diplomacy to covertly finance a war which Congress refused to finance
overtly.
The Tower Commission was not given either the time or the resources
to fully flesh out all that had taken place, but its report provided a valuable
first look at an administration which ran a virtual parallel foreign policy
with respect to Iran and Nicaragua, alongside the publicly-acknowledged
policy of not negotiating for hostages.
Twelve years earlier, he had addressed the question of secrecy in Amer-
ican policy. In 1975, responding to President Ford's State of the Union
address, Muskie said of Angola, "As in Vietnam, we find ourselves deeply
committed without prior notice or consultation with our people in a coun-
try where United States interests could not possibly be served at any
price." 12
He continued to make the point that only an open process could
"guarantee that interventions in other countries are an appropriate expres-
sion of deliberate United States policy, not the making of some faceless
bureaucrat."
Asked about the Tower Report in 1987, he said:
Well I think the single most important factor here is the over-obsession with
secrecy... there are occasions when it's necessary to hold closely informa-
tion about especially covert operations, but even possibly other operations
of the Government. But every time that you are over-concerned about
secrecy, you tend to abandon process.. 13
The conundrum of secret policies operated in the name of and on the
authority of an open society remains very real today. Muskie began work-
ing on this dilemma, in the domestic sphere, very early in his political
career. He was the principal sponsor of the proposal which ultimately
became known as the "Sunshine Law." This law built on the 1966 Free-
dom of Information Act, an essentially dead letter law until the 1970s. He
was fond of saying that "sunshine is the best disinfectant." His outrage
against secrecy was aggravated in 1971 when he obtained a classified FBI
report, routinely circulated to high officials in all relevant government
agencies, which included reports on his appearance at an Earth Day Rally
on the Mall. He thought it unconscionable that in a free country agents of
government could be permitted to file reports on open meetings of people
gathered legally to speak and raise questions about government policy.
Muskie had a very keen sense of how far government ought to be
allowed to go and when government absolutely ought to be stopped, and
his views reflected very clearly the reasoning that guided those who drafted
the Bill of Rights.
12. Televised speech, Jan. 24, 1976, Washington D.C.
13. Press Conference, Tower Commission Report, Feb. 27, 1987, The White House,
Washington D.C.
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In 1977, Congress created the Intelligence Committees of each House,
an action in which Muskie's hearings on CIA activities played a founding
role. But ten years later, in 1987, Iran-Contra showed that bypassing the
Congress is easy for a determined Administration to accomplish. There is
little reason to doubt that a secret policy will embarrass some future
President.
He often said in later years that his greatest disappointment in public
life was that he was able to serve such a short time as Secretary of State.
Although his time of service at the State Department was short, it was
crowded with demanding, contentious, and dangerous issues. The revolu-
tionary regime of the Ayatollah Khomenei held fifty-four American
embassy employees hostage. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late
1979, the first direct Soviet incursion on the sovereign territory of another
nation since 1968. That, in turn, led to the NATO agreement to counter
Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe with the 1983 deploy-
ment of 572 new American cruise and ballistic missiles in the West. The
Polish labor union, Solidarnosc, was gaining support as the regime in
Poland was losing it. By the end of 1980, thirty Soviet armored divisions
surrounded Poland on all her borders. A victorious Vietnamese Army con-
quered Cambodia in 1979. The Chinese were supporting the Khmer Rouge
against Vietnam. The U.S., its final retreat from Saigon still a fresh mem-
ory, could not support the Vietnamese puppet government. In El Salvador,
three American nuns working on aid projects were brutally murdered by
supporters of the military junta then in power, sparking outrage in the U.S.
His involvement in some of these issues continued long after his for-
mal service ended. Although he left office before Iran released the Ameri-
can hostages, the fact that they were released in time for President Reagan
to celebrate their freedom on his inaugural day can be credited to the
efforts Muskie made during his brief tenure.
In addition, the Reagan administration asked Muskie for his help in
dealing with the situation in Cambodia, which was complicated by refugees
on the Thai border, Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, Chinese-
Vietnamese clashes, and a continuing low-level civil conflict in the country-
side throughout the decade. Indeed, even as this is written, the
Vietnamese-backed Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen, has apparently con-
cluded a successful coup. against the First Prime Minister, Norodom
Ranariddh.
Throughout the 1980s Muskie was active, but not publicly outspoken
about Southeast Asia. 'He took a trip to the region in October, 1989, and
issued a report on his return which urged a shift in U.S. policy:
For almost a decade, U.S. policy toward Cambodia has consisted primarily
of support for the resistance coalition fighting against the Vietnamese-
installed government of Cambodia.
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A policy that committed us in fact, if not in purpose, to an alliance with Pol
Pot was never morally comfortable, but it was felt by many to be justified as
a practical expression of our opposition to the Vietnamese invasion, and as
support for the ASEAN nations who feared Vietnamese expansionism. The
policy is no longer justifiable.
We should reject the idea that Cambodia must be subjected to war until a
comprehensive political settlement is achieved . . . [i]f this means that we
must part company with China, which backs the Khmer Rouge, so be it.
China's interests are not our interests in every case, and here is one area in
which we should be firm and clear that we differ.
14
The subsequent Vietnamese withdrawal, substantially completed by the
end of 1990, was a key element of the process which permitted the U.N.-
supervision of the 1993 elections, lost by the Vietnamese-backed Hun Sen.
Ed Muskie's life spanned the era that brought the United States cen-
trally into the community of nations, beginning with the triumph of victory
in World War II, through the contradictions and conflicts of the Cold War,
and to the victory of democratic systems and free communications among
peoples taking shape today. For most of that time, conflict was far more
common than peace, and global war was almost always a possibility.
The calculations and tradeoffs that are routine in political life can be
tolerated when the ultimate issue at stake is the distant chance of a
regional, conventional war. But they cannot be tolerated when the risk is
global nuclear var. Throughout his political life, Muskie knew the ultimate
risk was always a global nuclear war. So he did not think of international
peace with any kind of millennial enthusiasm. He knew that what one
generation regards as peace, the next may experience as the pretext for war.
He was always a level-headed man who did not lose his way among the
rhetorical claims of true believers-in any cause.
He knew that peoples and cultures would differ, might well offend
each other, and could ultimately choose to settle the differences by
shooting.
He was animated by a different notion, one that may well seem retro-
grade in the present day, when "government" is reviled and "private" action
is vaunted. He did not think that it was possible to eliminate the sources of
tension among and between people, even people who were forced into close
proximity with each other. But he always believed that in the institutions
that peoples invent for themselves, what we call governments, there lay pos-
sibilities for creating a kind of tough-minded acquiescence to the facts of
life.
In short, Ed Muskie was a realist. He knew that peace has never yet
been permanent in our world. He knew it would take more than agree-
ments heavy on symbolism but light on sanctions. He understood that
14. Edmund S. Muskie, Don't Let the Khmer Rouge Call the Shots, WASH. PosT, Nov.
26, 1989, at C7.
642 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 30
peace demands large and difficult sacrifices from those who believe there is
truth on their side as well as from those whose theories have been discred-
ited. In the early 1970s, when US and Soviet goals were vastly distant from
each other, he thought that people satisfied with the material goods of life
would be less inclined to risk their own well-being to the goal of slaughter-
ing their neighbors. Events have proven him right. Russians today, chal-
lenged by poverty, pose no immediate threat and no immediately
identifiable future threat to our lives or our well-being.
Few people in our history could match Ed Muskie's eloquence on the
meaning of America. Once in public office, his profound respect for Ameri-
can democracy led him to act always with dignity and restraint, lest he
dishonor those he represented. As a result, he was the ideal in public ser-
vice, a man who accomplished much without ever compromising his prin-
ciples or his dignity. He was, above all, a man of peace.
